Disciplining Terror by Lisa Stampnitzky

Author:Lisa Stampnitzky [Stampnitzky, Lisa]
Language: eng
Format: epub
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Published: 2013-04-29T00:00:00+00:00

Elsewhere, Jenkins suggested that the Soviet theory was actually impeding practical counterterrorism efforts (Kempe 1983: 22). According to Schmid (1988)’s overview of the field, most credible individuals were skeptical, and he quotes “Another insider, who works for the CIA, found the book ‘poorly researched’ and called the ‘use of evidence flawed,’ with ‘quotations taken out of context,’ ‘biases creeping in on every page,’ and ‘data impossible to reproduce’” (Schmid and Jongman 1988: 105).

Official promotion of Sterling’s thesis encountered perhaps the strongest resistance when it ran up against the professional autonomy of the CIA intelligence analysis corps.13 Timothy Naftali, author of Blind Spot: The Secret History of American Counterterrorism, identified this as a crucial turning point in the history of US counterterrorism, noting that “the terrorism elite within the US Government balks and says this is just not right.”14 William Casey, who had directed Reagan’s 1980 presidential election campaign, was sworn in as director of Central Intelligence one week after the presidential inauguration (and would serve until 1987). Casey was also becoming convinced by the Soviet network theory. After reading Claire Sterling’s New York Times Magazine story,15 he encouraged the CIA intelligence corps to follow up. Tasked with verifying Sterling’s claims, however, the analysts found her method and findings flawed. “Our analysis showed that what she claimed often didn’t stand up,” John McMahon, CIA deputy director of operations, said. “It just was not true” (McMahon quoted by Persico 1990: 287–8). The senior national intelligence officer responsible for looking at the Soviet Union wrote a report that “took a strong anti-Sterling line” and “pretty much cleared the Soviets of involvement in terrorism” (Woodward 1987: 125). Casey, in response, reportedly advised his analysts: “Read Claire Sterling’s book, and forget this mush” (Woodward 1987: 125), adding, “I paid $13.95 for this and it told me more than you bastards whom I pay $50,000 a year” (Woodward 1987: 126). Casey and Sterling had a meeting. When the skeptical conclusions of the CIA analysts were broached, according to McMahon, who was present at the meeting, “Claire Sterling. . .jumped all over Bill. She said, ‘Your people aren’t pursuing this thing because half of them are leftist sympathizers’” (Persico 1990: 286–7).

Definitional problems plagued attempts to bridge the gaps between Soviet theory fans and skeptics. While the CIA analysts resisted Sterling’s framework, Bobby Ray Inman, deputy director of the CIA, and Eugene Tighe, director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, were both sympathetic to the theory. Casey asked Tighe to have the DIA analysts prepare a report on the topic, and the DIA draft that emerged supported Sterling’s hypothesis. A few weeks later, Woodward says, Casey received a memo from Lincoln Gordon, former president of Johns Hopkins University and “one of three members of a senior review panel at the CIA charted with bringing non-intelligence professional and academic review to the formal estimates” (Woodward 1987: 126). Gordon wrote that the CIA report used too narrow a definition of terrorism, while the DIA’s was perhaps too broad, and Casey asked Gordon to write his own report on the matter.

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